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If Madagascar  moved  toward  a simpler,  uniform  tax structure,  it
could  raise  the  same  revenues  it now  raises  - with less  incentive
for the tax evasion  and smuggling  now  prevalent.
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1.  Introduction
Like many other poor countries with underdeveloped  aministrative  capacities, Madagascar
experiences  substantial smuggling. The motives for smuggling  are several, ranging from the desire to
survive in the face of a host of barriers created  by government  policies and the lack of infrastructure,  to
tax evasion.  The reasons  for (and effects of) smuggling  in the African context are well described by
Stolper and Deardorff (1990) who argue that smuggling  is unlikely to involve any extra real costs of
trading and note that trade along an East-West axis is natural whereas states are often organized along
North-South  axes where trading is more difficult  to organize. They even go further and argue that under
African conditions  smuggling  is likely to shift out the production  possibility  curve as it is likely to reduce
pervasive domestic  distortions. Nonetheless,  it is no exaggeration  that, notwithstanding  the proliferation
of tax exemptions,  smuggling  to avoid taxes is pervasive in low-income  countries where tax structures
are exceedingly complex and tax administration  is notoriously weak.  Madagascar is no exception.
Exemptions  and evasions lead to a revenue loss and discriminatory  taxes lead to a welfare loss.  In this
paper, we take a first step towards analyzing  potential losses from these two effects. We also examine
the resource allocation and welfare effects of revenue neutral tax reform.
Before  embarling in an evaluation  of potential  tax loss, it is interesting  to note the preoccupation
of many developing country authorities  with tax evasion.  Again, Madagascar  is no exception and has
engaged  the services  of preshipment  inspection  (PSI) firms to verify that the quality and quantity  of goods
shipped meets contractual  standards and that prices charged are within "reasonable" norms.  A recent
evaluation  of Madagascar's  use of PSI by Yeats (1991) comes  to the conclusion  that, by and large, it has
not been either cost effective, or successfil in reducing capital flight or customs duty avoidance. These
concerns result from scrutinizing  Madagascar's relative import  prices before and after PSI requirements2
were adopted  and suggest  that the problem  of tax "avoidance"  remains a lively issue deserving  of further
analysis.
In  section 2,  we describe briefly the Malagasy tax system and recent reforms aiming at
streamlining the tax structure.  We also compare the composition of government revenues with that
prevailing in other low-income countries, noting that the Malagasy government raises a substantial
proportion of its revenues from distortionary trade taxes.  In section 3, we present the structure of a
standard  static general equilibrium  model which we use to address the issues raised above.  In section 4,
we give rough calculations  of tax revenues  lost through tax evasion. In section 5, we report  results of
a standard analysis  of tax reform in the absence  of tax evasion and without a revenue constraint.  The
estimates  in sections 4 and 5 are with a ten-sector model so as to allow for sufficient disaggregation  to
capture the distortionary  effects  of the Malagasy  tax system. Conclusions  follow in section 6.
2.  A Description of the Malagasy Tax System and a Comparison with Other Countries
As the majority of developing countries, Madagascar  has relied heavily on trade taxes as the
major source of fiscal revenue. At the time of writing Oate  1990), the tax system in Madagascar  can be
broadly described  in terms of three major categories. First, domestic  direct taxes which include income
taxes, property taxes, and other taxes.  Second, domestic indirect taxes which include the value added
tax and the consumption  tax.  Third, international  trade taxes which include export and import taxes.
Table I summarizes  the structure of the Malagasy  tax system described in the text.
2.1  Domestic  direct taxes
Tax on company  Drofits  (IBS). Companies  are imposed  a tax on profits (Imp6t  sur les
Bendfices  des Societds,  IBS)  which affects  net profit from all origins, including  activities  abroad. ForeignTable  1.  The  Malagasy  Tax  System
Source  Type  Tax  Rates  1988  revenue'  and
(% of tax revenue)
D  45%  for commerce  22.7  (6)
0  D  Profits  (IBS)  35%  for other  activities  22.2  (6)
M  I  Individuals  (IGR)  Progressive  max.  rate:  45%
E  R  Property  (see text)  5.1  (1)




I  Value-added  (TUT)  15% except  for exports,  40.3  (11)
T  N  necessities  and
A  D  agricultural  products
x  I
E  R
S  E  Consumption  tax  (TC)  5% to  10%  for most  of  28.8  (8)
C  300 products  (see text)
T
T  I  Customs  duty  (DD)  5% to 45%  (see text)  18.3  (5)
R  N
A  D
D  I  Import  tax  (TI)  5% to 80%  (see  text)  73.1  (20)
E  R
E  Other  import  taxes  (see text)  11.2  (3)
T  C
A  T  Export  taxes  Specific  tax  on vanilla,  43.8  (12)
X  cloves,  coffee  (see text)
E
S  Value-added  (TUT)  15% on imports  54.1  (15)
a.  In billions  of FMG..
Source:  Authors'  elaboration  ffom  Guillaumont  et al.  (1990).4
companies  are taxed only on profits realized  in Madagascar. Collectives  are not subject  to this tax since
the partners are subject to the tax on individuals, The tax rate on profits became uniform in 1983 and
was fixed at 45 percent.  Before that, companies were imposed different taxes depending on their
economic  activities. However, in 1987, in order to encourage  industrial  activity  the following  preferential
rates were applied: 40 percent for industrial  enterprises, 35 percent for agricultural enterprises, and 45
percent for  commercial enterprises.  Besides creating administrative difficulties, the  adoption of
differential  rates across activities  gave an incentive  to arbitrage  by shifting  towards activities  with a lower
tax rate.  Effective  January 1st, 1989, the tax rates were once again set at 45 percent for commercial
activities  and at 35 percent for agriculture, industry, mining, hotels, and transport. Moreover, the fixed
portion of the minimum  tax levy was no longer  differentiated  according  to the legal form of the company
and was set at FMG 400,000 in all cases. On the other hand, the variable portion of the minimum  levy
was raised from 0.1 to 0.5 percent of sales revenue.
This description of the frequent changes in the structure of the IBS shows the difficulties  the
Malagasy  authorities  have had with settling  on a satisfactory  tax on company  profits. Also, the numerous
exemptions  and differences in tax rates must have provided strong incentives  for arbitraging  across tax
categories  if not for outright evasion  since the tax rates are quite high.
Taxes on individuals  (IGR). The personal  income of individuals  was subject to two progressive
taxes:  a tax on wages and salaries (nmp6t  sur les Revenus Salariaux et Assimiles, IRSA) and a tax on
non-wage income (ImpOt  sur les Revenus Non Salariaux, IRNS).  The IRSA is independent  of any
revenue from sources other than wages and salaries, all of which are subject to the IRNS.  There was
no general complementary  tax on revenues  from all sources until recently.
Effective January 1, 1989, a major reform on the personal income tax system was introduced.
For the IRSA, it involved a marginal tax structure with 9 'tranches'  and a maximum  marginal rate of
40 percent beginning at FMG 500,000 per month. For the IRNS, the reform involved  a marginal tax5
structure  with 8 'tranches'  and a maxinum marginal  rate of 50 percent beginning  at FMG 5 million per
annum.
In 1990, a new reform introduced  a general tax on revenue (Imp6t  GenEral  sur le Revenu, IGR),
which was still strongly progressiv.e  and with a maximum marginal rate of 45 percent.  The IGR,
although not purposely set by the authorities to decrease the average tax rate, would eliminate the
regressive  elements  that the previous system  incorporated.  The total revenue, independently  of its origin,
would  constitute  the criterion on the ability  to pay taxes, so that some of the differentiations  and injustices
hidden in the old system would be eliminated.
Taxes on proper.  Taxes on property include (i) taxes on real estate which include a land tax
levied annually on the estimated productive value of land based on the type of crop used, a tax on
buildings levied on the rental value of buildings, and a surtax on buildings; (ii) death and gift duties
which are levied on the net value of property  causa  mortis  or inter vivos; and (iii) property  transfer  duties
which are levied on sale, lease or exchange  of property.
Oher taxes on income. Other taxes on income  include taxes on capital income for which the tax
rates vary from 45 percent on dividends  to 25 percent on other profits distributed by companies,  and a
tax of 15 percent on transfers abroad.
Collection  of the direct taxes  described  above  is low.  Administrative  capacity  of central  and local
tax authorities is weak.  Furthermore, the absence of an accounting  system for taxpayers worsens the
situation,  since they do not have  verifiable  accounts. Indeed,  eighty percent of the approximately  10,000
businesses  subject to IRSA are taxed on a presumptive  basis.  Underestimation  of income is therefore a
widespread  phenomenon.6
2.2  Domestic  Indirect taxes
The Malagasy  domestic  indirect tax system is based on two major types of taxes: a value-added
tax (Taxe Unique sur les Transactions,  TUT) and a consumption  tax (Taxe I la Consommation,  TC).
Value-added  tax (TUT). The  TUT is a tax on value added  which has a fixed  rate. This rate was
changed in 1983 from 10 percent to  15 percent.  The TUT is applied to all sectors involved in local
production including  the services sector, and to imports. It excludes  the necessity  consumption  goods,
agricultural products and exports.  The TUT is a major source of fiscal revenues.  It represented on
average  10 percent of  the fiscal revenues between 1981 and  1988.  Moreover, the TUT  is  not
distortionary  between sources, although exemptions  between activities can be viewed as distortionary.
Consum2foitn  tax (TC). The second  major tax on goods  and services is the consumption  tax. The
TC covers more than 300 products including  many  inputs. A large number  of goods which are excluded
from the TUT are subject to the TC.  The TC comprises multiple rates which depend on the type of
product.  It ranges from 5 percent to 500 percent, although  most products are taxed at 5 percent or 10
percent.  [Other indirect taxes include taxes on insurance premium and motor vehicle but represent a
negligible  share of the fiscal revenue (0.9 percent in 1988)].
2.3  Taxes on foreign trade
Import taxes in Madagascar  serve two purposes: to protect the local industry against imports,
and to raise fiscal revenue. Prior to 1988,  restraints applied  on imports  included quantitative  restrictions
(QRs), customs duties, import taxes, consumption  surcharges, and special import surcharges. After the
fiscal reform of 1990, import duties were reduced to a customs duty, a fiscal duty on import, a value-
added tax on imports (see above), and import duties on petroleum products.7
Quantitative  restrictions  (QRs) were imposed  in Madagascar  mainly to overcome the shortage  of
foreign exchange.  Moreover, imports of goods for which local production  could satisfy demand were
prohibited.  Q3RS  were completely  eliminated  in 1988 and 1989.
Customs duly (DD).  The customs duty (Droit de Douane I l'entree, DD) has seven different
rates (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 35, 45 percent) applied to the c.i.f. value of imports.
Import tax (TI).  The import tax (taxe I l'importation,  TI) is levied mostly on the c.i.f. value of
imports  or on physical volumes  for selected  goods. On January 1, 1988, the tariff reform introduced a
simplified tariff structure which reduced the minimum number of brackets from 69 to  16, with a
maximum rate of 80 percent and a minimum rate of 5 percent.  (For certain products, a temporai 3
surcharge of 30 percent was introduced to ease the transition period.)  Effective January 1, 1989, the
minimum duty was raised to 10 percent, except for some products such as fertilizers, pesticides, and
pharmaceutical  products.  In addition, the temporary surcharge was cut to  10 percent.  The ultimate
objective  of the tariff reform is to put into place a simplified  tariff structure with rates ranging from 10
percent to 50 percent.
Other taxes on imports. The TUT and eventually  the TC also affect imports  as well as domestic
production. The TC is applied to the c.i.f. value of imports, while the rate of the TUT is fixed at 15
percent and is applied  to the c.i.f. value of imports inclusive  of the DD, the TI, and the TC.  A stamp
duty (droit de timbre douanier)  of 1 percent is levied on the perceived  taxes (DD, TI, and the TC).
Export taxes.  In order to encourage  exports and reduce reliance  on export duties and taxes. the
government eliminated  export  taxes on all goods in 1987, except for vanilla, coffee, and cloves. In 1988,
the export duty on cloves was set at the specific rate of FMG 1  10/kg, and the one on coffee was set at
the specific rate of FMG 19/kg.  Furthermore, an export surcharge is levied on coffee, cloves, and8
vanilla in addition to the export duty.  It consists  of a rate of 10 percent for coffee, US$1I per kg. for
vanilla, and 15 percent for cloves.
2.4  A Comparison with Other Countrles
It is apparent from the above  description  that Madagascar  has a very complex  tax structure. This
is not uncommon among developing countries which have been heavily influenced  by their colonial
legacy.  The emphasis  on progressive income  taxes, a cascaded structure of indirect  taxes, a schedular
system for direct taxes, and a proliferation  of exceptions  encourage too many arbitrages that erode the
tax base.  Also, the resulting  system  would appear  to be far too complex for the country's administrative
capabilities  as the recent simplifications  in the tax system suggest.  In his recent review of tax reforms
in several developing countries, Thirsk (1990) has noted a general across-the-board  move towards a
streamlining  of tax rates, abolishment  of exemptions  so as to bring transparency  to the tax system and
remove the opportunities  for arbitrating across tax rates and tax categories.
Before  turning to a quantitative  analysis of the likely effects of such a tax reform, we compare
briefly Madagascar's  structure  of tax revenues  with that of other low-income  countries. Comparisons  are
reported in table 2.  The comparisons  in table 2a siggest two observations. First, even among low-
income countries, Madagascar's tax revenues (as a share of GDP) are a third lower than in other
developing  countries. From the description  of the tax structure in section  2, this certainly cannot be due
to low tax rates.  Rather it must be a combination  of tax exemptions and tax evasion.  Second is the
unusually  high share of trade taxes in total revenues. The relatively high share of trade taxes in total tax
revenue reflects a combination  factors. First, is a weak administrative  capability  that must have reflected
itself more strongly in the application  of ta- rates and exemptions for domestic taxes.  Second, is the
important  share of coffee, vanilla  and cloves (two-thirds  of agricultural exports). For vanilla and cloves,
Madagascar  is likely to have monopoly  power in world markets. Hence there is an argument  for taxation9
Table 2.  Tax Revenues
(2a)  A Comparison with Other Low Income Countries
(1986-88  average)
Tax
Revenue  Income Tax/  Domestic  International
(IR)/GDP  TR  Tax/TR  Tax/TR
Low income
countriese  16.3  22.4  27.3  30.9
Madagascar  11.8  14.3  28.3b  55.6
(2b) Madagascar: Budgetary Revenue (1988)9
Foreign  Budgetary  Income  Other
Trade  Tax on Goods  & Profits
200.5  96.8d'  51.49  11.8
a.  Low-income  countries: sample of 36 countries  with 1980  income per capita
below $500.  Average  values for 1986-88. Source: Faini and de Melo (1991) table 2.
b.  Includes  taxes on goods and services  and taxes on property.
c.  Billion FMG.  Source: Guillaumont  et al. (1990) and authors' calculations.
d.  Includes  monopoly  profits tax (24.8 billion).
e.  Includes  profits (22.7 billion) and wage tax (14.4 billion).10
for taxation  on both revenue and welfare grounds. Apart from export  tax revenues, Madagascar's  source
of budgetary  revenues is fairly similar to that of other low income countries.
The detailed  figures of budgetary  revenues for Madagascar  in table 2b for 1988 reveal another
characteristic  of tax structures  in low income countries: a distortionary  tax structure across markets  and
activities.  Trade taxes discriminate across markets, and profits and wage taxes discriminate against
investment  and employment.
We retain two conclusions  from this brief look at the Malagasy  fiscal system:  a complex tax
structure that yields relatively low revenues, and hence a suggestion  of tax evasion; and a distorted tax
structure that discriminates  against trade and agricultural activities.  In the following, we attempt to
quantify both the potential loss in revenue from evasion and the distortionary costs of taxation while
recognizing  that the Malagasy  administrative  tax ability is weak.
3.  A General Equilibrium Tax Model
We now describe briefly the general equilibrium  tax model we shall use to evaluate  the welfare
and resource allocation effects of tax reform.  The features of the model are standard to computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models, except for the inclusion of the various taxes which reflect the
Malagasy  tax system.  We therefore describe briefly the model using a one-sector formulation  to save
on  notation.'  The empirical application is with a ten-sector model calibrated to  1988 data whose
aggregation  is described  in table 4.
Consumer behavior is represented by a  linear expenditure system.  The resulting demand
functions (equation 1) are derived from the maximization  of the Stone-Geary  utility  indicator.  These
1  Except for the treatment of technology  for intermediate  demand and the treatment of taxes, the
model's structure is quite similar to the one presented in de Melo and Tarr (1992, Chapter 3).  For an
introductory  presentation  to CGE models, see Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982, Chapters 5 and 6).11
Table  3A.  A One-Sector Tax Model
Consumer  Behavior:
C =  LES (PQ. )  (1)
Production  Technology:
X =  CES (LD'  KD' V;  0)  (2)
V=aX  (3)
Factor Demands:
LD= CES(r,$)  (4)
RD
Domestic Demand  and AllocatioL.  of Traded Goods:
Q =  CES (DD,  M; a)  (5)
DD  =CES(PD PY  a)  (6)
X =  CET (Ds,E; t)  (7)
Ds = CET(P,,Piz)  (8)
Foreign Commodity  Supply and Demand Functions:
_mHM  (9)
II,  Hi  or  E=Dg(PE;,.)  (10)
Domestic  Prices:
PvA|  =  PX  (I - t)  - a PQ  (  1
P, X =  PD  D,  D  PE  (12)
P  Q = (1  + tQ +  tVA PVA)  [PD  Ds  PMJ  (13)12
Table 3A.  A One-Sector Tax Model (continued)
Foreign Commodity  Prices:
PM=  (I +  t,M)  Hfie  (14)
Pe = (I  - t  E)  (15)
Market Equilibria:
DD  = VD  +CD  (16)
DD =  Ds  (17)
LD =  (18)
KD =  S  (19)
Foreign Trade Constraint
eB  =  IIUM  - H,E  (20)
Income  and Government  Revenue:
Y  = (1 - tl)  WD + (1 - tr)  r  KD + YG +  eB  (21)
YG =t  PX X +  tQ  PQ Q + tVA  PVA  PQ  Q . tM  M  M e +  tI  ,Ee  tL  *  t,rK  (22)
Numeraire:
PD  a  1  (23)
Notes:  A bar ovef a variable indicates  an exogenous  variable.13
Table 3 (continued):  Variables and parameters in the one sector tax model
DD  domestic demand for domestic goods
PD  domestic disposable  (after tax) purchaser  prices of domestic goods
Y  domestic income
C  personal consumption  (composite)
X  gross domestic output
LD  demand for labor
KD  demand for capital by sector
V  total intermediate  use (composite)
Ls  aggregate  labor supply (exogenous)
w  average wage rate
Ks  aggregate  capital supply
r  rental rate on capital
Q  composite  good for domestic demand
M  imports
Pm  domestic currency price of imports
Ds  domestic production  for domestic  use
E  exports
Pl  domestic currency price of exports
Px  producer price of domestic  output
PQ  purchaser  price of composite  domestic  demand
PvA price of value added
YO  government  income
e  exchange  rate
B  exogenous  net foreign borrowing
.r,  exogenous  world price of imports
xit  exogenous  world price of exports (except when indicated)
tVA value added tax rate (base is total value added)
tk  excise or sales tax (base is domestic  sales)
tm  import tariff rate (base is domestic import demand)
to  export tax rate (base is exports)
tx  indirect or monopoly  tax (base is monopoly  revenue)
tL  tax on labor  income
tk  tax on capital income
StruOural and policy parameters
*  eONsticity  of substitution  between labor and capital in domestic  production
a  intermediate  use coefficient
a  elasticity  of substitution  between  domestic and imported goods
T  elasticity  of transformation  between  domestic  and exported goods
tD  indirect  tax rate on domestic sector  production
tM  import tariff rate
ts  export subsidy rate
r,  elasticity of foreign export demand14
demand  functions  allow  for non-unitary  income  elasticities  of demand and non-zero  cross-price  elasticities
of demand between domestically-produced  and foreign-produced  consumption  goods.  The production
technology is constant  returns to scale and involves intermediates  and two primary factors, capital and
labor, which are mobile between  sectors and are both in fixed supply. The functional  form describing
the production  technology  is a constant  elasticity  of substitution  (CES) function  to represent  capital-labor
substitution  and substitution  between domestic and foreign intermediates  (equation 2), and a Leontief
function  between intermediates  (as a whole) and gross output (equation 3).  Atomistic  firms maximize
profits independently  and are price-takers in factor and product markets. The resulting factor demands
are given in equation  4.
The treatment of foreign trade recognizes that in an economy like Madagascar, domestic and
foreign-produced  goods are poor substitutes. Likewise,  goods  sold abroad  and goods  sold in the domestic
market are imperfect substitutes.  This formulation is known as the national product differentiation
assumption. This assumption  gives rise to the composite  good aggregation  functions  in equations  S and
7.  By assuming that demanders (suppliers) minimize (maximize) the cost (revenue) of purchasing
(selling)  a given quantity of composite  good Q(X), gives rise to the first order conditions  in equations  6
and 8.  Imports are in perfectly elastic supply (equation 9), but foreign export demand may not be
perfectly  elastic (equation  9) to reflect the possibility  that Madagascar  may have monopoly  power for its
principal agricultural commodity  exports (vanilla, cloves). 2
The following  five equations  describe  prices and the various wedges  introduced  by the Malagasy
tax system. The equations  describing domestic  prices (equations 11, 12, 13) result from the application
of Euler's theorem  to the linear homogenous  functions  describing  technology  choice and goods allocation
across domestic and foreign markets.  Three wedges are introduced: the "monopoly  profits'  tax, t.,
2  For a description  of the implications  of this external closure on the shape of the domestic offer
curve, see de Melo and Robinson (1989).15
which is applied to all sales; 3 the sales tax (TUT), tQ,  which is applied to all sales on the domestic
market; and the value-added  tax, tVA,  which is applied to imports and to domestic value-added. The
commodity tax structure is completed by tariffs on imports (equation 14) and by taxes on exports
(equation  5).
The next set of equations  (16, 17, 18, 19) describes  the conditions  for equilibrium  in the goods
and factor markets. The model includes  a foreign trade constraint  (equation  20) so that the equilibrium
real exchange rate is determined  endogenously. To facilitate  the welfare interpretation  of tax reforms,
all government  revenue, YO  (equation  22) is returned to the representative  consumer  in lump-sum  fashion
(equation  21). Because  of the linear homogeneity  of all demand and supply functions,  only relative  prices
can be determined. Hence the need to select a numdraire (equation  23).'
4.  An Evaluation of Tax Revenue Less
In this section we use the model to estimate the potential government revenue loss through
exemptions  and various forms  of tax evasion  (smuggling,  bribery, etc.). Table 4 describes the ten-sector
sectoral aggregation  and tax revenues  by tax instrument. The disaggregation  into ten sectors was deemed
the minimum  one to capture the incidence  of the main tax instruments  used in Madagascar. The structure
of the economy  in table 4 and the values  of the endogenous  variables correspond  to a 'base" solution  of
the model.  This calibrated base simulation  replicates the actual disaggregated  flows in the Malagasy
economy  in 1988.5 Three quarters  of exports originate in agriculture which is also, by far, the largest
3  In the numerical application,  this tax is only applied  to sales of agricultural products.
4  By Walras law one of the equations  in the model  is redundant. However, for expositional  purposes
all equations  describing  the model are included in table 3.
5 How we updated the 1984  input-output  table and reconciled  it with national  accounts, foreign  trade
figures and budgetary  revenue  figures is discussed  in an appendix  available  upon request.  It would  have
been desirable to disaggregate  agriculture into export cash crops and other (mainly for domestic use)
agriculture. However, the input-output  table did not make this distinction  so further disaggregation  was
not possible.Shams Aca  4Adc_b  Emeq  Pw_ced Food  UL  Inui  HaVy b1hufty  OL Mmaf.  Trnpoet  Cnmmwe  Snies  No-mahet  Ws  Vahe Sa")  ~~~~~~~~~~~  (1)3)  (4)  mS  (6  (7)  m  (9)  (!°)  (11)
29  6  is  6  4  2  13  9  10  3  794.2
VFl  37  1  4  2  _  19  14  15  _7  324.9
EBipoysn  24  1  3  6  S  2  9  is  23  9  2U42
Capit  Stock  45  1  4  1  0  1  17  16  16  0  2364
ExPort  74  _  3  S  0  0  11  0  2  0  55.9
wmpts  2  25  12  16  20  3  10  2  10  I  73.9
a  _enu  24  6  3  24  31  5  3  2  2  O  331.01 Oncverae  ., Rovew_  __  __
Import Tax  3  9  3  30  46  S  O  O  O  O  1562
Expon  Tax  _  __  10_0  n_  o_  o  o  o  o_ooo  43.t8
Vab  T-  d  x  40  2  4  2  1  1  20  15  16  O  403
Excite  Tax  O  O  O  60  40  O_  O  O  O_O_2t.
Easticites:
Imporn Deman  0.9  0.6  0.7  1.2  0.6  0.9  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.4
Expon  Supply  1.0  0.6  1.0  1.2  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  _  __
Conrumer  Demand  -0.4  -0.3  -0.4  40.5  -0.2  -0.2  |  0.4  -0.3  |  0.4  -0.2
Income;aEbsticity  0.8  1.2  0.8  1.4  0.6  0.8  1.2  I  1.4  1.6
Capitul Labor  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8 Substitution
Elasticity  I___I_I
Notes:  All etries except  elasticities  amr  ectoral perenages  of the corresponding  variable  (e.g. agricuture's re  ia goss  output is 29 percent).
a.  All values ia rows I to 6 are 10 billion  FMa  except  employment  (1,000  man  yer).  AHI  tax collection  data  re in billion FMG.
b.  The  difference betwea  aectorml  tax revenue (269.4  billion FMG) and  toal  govenmet  revenue  is accounted  for by the wage  tax (14.4  billion FMG), the profits  tax (22.7  bilion FMG). the income tax (12.3 billion  FMG) and  the agicultal  monopoly  indirect  tax (24.8  billion  FMG), all of which are  icludd  in the model.17
sector in the economy. About half of government  revenue  from tax collections  originates in industry  and
a quarter from agriculture  because  of the export  tax on vanilla, cloves, and coffee. Crucial to the general
equilibrium  estimates  discussed  here, are the assumed elasticity values for demand and supply. These
are reported in the bottom of table 4 and can  be viewed  as representative  of elasticities  used in partial and
in general equilibrium  simulations.'
The sources of tariff revenue by sector and by instrument are further disaggregated  in table S.
The purpose of that table is to provide the basis for our tax evasion calculations. To this end, we report
side by side formal and effective (in parenthesis)  tax rates.  The effective tax rates are those that were
derived from the national income and fiscal data and yielded the observed tax revenues. These are the
tax rates used in the base calibrated simulation. Except for export taxes which are calculated  from the
tax revenues  on exports of cloves, coffee, and vanilla, all other schedular tax rates in table 4 are drawn
from the description of the Malagasy tax system in section 2.  Import taxes are calculated from the
published  customs  and fiscal duties, using imports  as weights  in aggregating  to the sectoral classification
in the model. To account for exemptions,  we have applied  the value-added  tax to all sectors except non-
market activities and the livestock component of agriculture.  Because of the high variance across
commodities  (10 percent to  140 percent), we have assumed that the excise tax on consumption  only
applies  to consumer  goods. Our estimate  of 30 percent is a guess of the average rate that is intended  by
the fiscal  system. The actual revenues  collected  by the government  in 1988  amounted  to 360 billion  FMG
(see table 2b).  Of this amount, 331 billion FMG are captured  by the tax instruments  incorporated  in the
model.
As can be seen from table 4, over 80 percent of tax revenues comes from taxes collected on a
6  In order to test the robustness  of our calculations,  we also report in section  5 estimates  with high
aLd low elasticities. High  low) elasticity sets are obtained  by doubling (halving)  the elasticity  values
reported in table 4.  Because  the revenue and welfare calculations  are only mentioned  briefly.18
sectoral basis.  Because sectoral tax collection is subject to efficiency losses through exemptions and
disparity in rates, we shall concentrate  our simulations  on these sectoral  taxes.  Revenues  collected  from
the four sectoral tax instruments  incorporated  in the model are also indicated in the bottom of table S.
They are the same as the totals reported in table 4, column :1.
Our first question  then is how much  would  the government  have collected  had the schedular  rates
reported in table 5 actually been imposed.  To answer this question, we solve the model with the
schedular  rates given in table 5 in lieu of the corresponding  effective  ones, and compare the results with
the base solution  obtained with the effective  tax rates.  Note that due to lack of information,  there are no
built-in differences between effective and schedular rates for export taxes.  Hence, in the calculations
reported below, revenue gains result from import duty, VAT, and consumption  tax collection.
The estimated  revenue  less due to the combination  of tax evasion,  weak administrative  collection,
and exemptions  (not incorporated  in the formal tax structure described in table 5) is shown in table 6.
Revenue  loss is very large, ranging from 48 percent for import duties to 763 percent for the VAT.  As
expected,  loss is much greater for the VAT and consumption  taxes, as it is ten to twenty times larger in
percentage  terms than for import taxes.  This very large difference is certainly partly due to a greater
number of exemptions  than those accounted  for directly, for taxes on domestic sales provided to public
and other enterprises.  But the overriding factor accounting  for this difference is still likely to be the
relatively  greater difficulty  in collecting  taxes on domestic  sales in a country with a large rural population
and a weak administrative  system.19
Table S.  Formal  (Schedular)  and Effective  Tax Structure in the Malagasy  Model (1988)
(Effective  tax rates  in parenthesis)
Value  Taxes  Taxes  VAT  Excise  tax
addedb  imports  exports  (TUT)  (TC)
Agriculture  (39)'  1230  53.3 (40.3)  15.0  10.2  (1.6)
Energy  (2)  60  30.3  (7.3)  - 15.0  (0.8)
Processed  food  (7)  220  62.0 (5.7)  15.0  (1.3)  30.0 (3.7)
Light  industry  (3)  104  55.3 (37.6)  - 15.0 (0.9)  30.0 (3.3)
Heavy  industry  274  55.3  (44.8)  - 15.0 (0.4)
Other  manuf.  (1)  34  46.0 (44.8)  - 15.0  (0.9)
Tranport  (5)  143  - 15.0  (1.3)
Commerce  (11)  357  - 15.0  (1.2)
Services  (23)  730  - 15.0  (1.2)
Non-market  (6)  194  - - -
Actual tax collection"  156.7  43.8  40.3  28.6
All tax  rates  in percent  are formal  rates  as defined  in the notes  to this table.
a.  Figures  in parentheses  are sectoral  shares  in GDP.
b.  10  billion  FMG
c.  Tax revenues  are from Guillaumont  et. al. (1990)  and IMF (1990). Total  tax revenues  in table  4 are 331  billion
PMG.20
Notes  to 1able S
Calculation  of formal rates
YAT. Application  of sectral  shares in value-added  to the VAT receipts. In agriculture, VAT was
applied to 68 percent of that sector's value-added  to take into account exemption  on livestock.  For
imports, application of receipts reported in IMF (1990, table 1) applying import shares to the import
classification  in that table.  (imported raw materials among sectors 4, 5, 6 according to those sectors
intermediate  input shares.)
Exeise-tax. Application  of sectoral shares in domestic sales to sectors 3 and 4 (Negligible  excise
tax revenues on imports omitted).
Trade taxes.  Imports disaggregation  of customs and fiscal duties reported in IMF (1990, table 1)
according to import shares for food products from 1984 1/0 table.  (Raw materials treated as above;
equipment  goods classified  as heavy industry;  non-food  consumption  products classified  as light industry.
Energy tax rate from IMF (1989, table 18).
Exports.  Rate obtained by applying  the export tax revenue on coffee, vanilla  and cloves on total
agricultural  export revenue.21
Table 6.  Increase In Revenue from Applying Formal Tax Rates^
(percentage increase In parenthesis)
Tax Instrument  Import Duties  VAT (TUT)  Excise Tax (CC)
Revenue (billion  FMG)  81 (52 percent)  308 (763 percent)  139 (486 percent)
a.  Revenues  obtained by solving the model  described in table 3 with the schedular tax rates shown in
table S.
The estimates  in table 6 thus suggest  a very large revenue  loss from the combination  of exemptions,
tax evasion, and smuggling. Under the application  of the schedular rates, the combined revenues  from
import  duties, VAT, and consumption  tax would increase (percentage  of base GDP in parenthesis)  from
billion FMG 225 (6.4 percent) to 528 (15.1 percent).  No doubt, such revenue increases would be
unattainable  and exemptions  are a large contribution  to the shortfall in revenues.
The model also gives an estimate of the welfare loss that would occur from the increased tax
burden (under the assumption  that there are no tax collection costs or  welfare gains/losses from tax
evasion  activities). Applying  these schedular  rates would result in an estimated  welfare loss of 14 billion
FMG (0.4 percent of base GDP).  This relatively small welfare loss is common  to general equilibrium
estimates. In these calculations,  however, this low magnitude  also reflects that the movement  to schedular
rates would significantly  reduce the dispersion in sectoral rates.  This is so for two reasons.  First, the
dispersion  between  trade taxes and other taxes would be diminished. Across sectors, the VAT would be
a flat 15 percent for all activities  except agriculture  (10.2 percent) and non-market  activities (0 percent),
and the excise tax, a flat 30 percent for processed food and light industry.  The current effective rates22
are also fairly uniform, but there is a great difference  in level with the effective structure of tariff duties
which wou!d  be reduced by a move to the schedular  rates.  Second, the dispersion in tariffs on imports
would  be much  less under the schedular  system. Both this reduction in dispersion across instruments  and
within  the import  tariff structure contribute  to a relatively low welfare cost from applying  the schedular
rates.
S.  The Relative EMciency of Alternative Tax Instruments
To evaluate  the efficiency  of the tax system, we carry out three simulations. First, we calculate
the welfare gains from removing taxes, one by one.  This experiment  is of course unrealistic insofar as
the Malagasy government cannot use more efficient tax instruments (such as an  income tax) than
presently. However, this calculation  gives a rough estimate  of the likely revenue  and welfare loss. Note
first that, because we use a general equilibrium model, the actual revenue loss of abolishing a tax
instrument is not necessarily equal to the revenue collection from that instrument because of general
equilibrium  repercussions. Second, we calculate the uniform tax structures that would give the same
revenue  as under the current effective  tax structure. This experiment  therefore approximates  the intent
of many recent tax reforms which have tended to  flatten tax rates to reduce tax avoidance and tax
evasion. 7 Third, we calculate  Pigovian  tax ratios which are a commonly  used measure  of the efficiency
of a tax instrument. 8 For the second and third experiments, we assume that taxes are only applied to
those sectors in which there was a positive effective  tax rate (see table 5).  Thus these calculations  at least
take partly into account the limits of the administrative  tax capability of the Malagasy  government.
Table 7 gives the estimated revenue loss and welfare effect of removing each tax, one-at-a-time.
7 For a description  of the actual tax reform measures  carried out in the ten developing  countries,  see
Thirsk (1990).
8  For similar calculations  of Pigovian  tax ratios  see Clarete  and Whalley  (1987)  and de Melo, Stanton
and Tarr (1989).23
Because  the removal  of these distortions  is done on a piecemeal  basis, one is inherently  in a second-best
situation, and there is no guarantee  that welfare is increased. The largest source of revenue loss (and
welfare gain) comes  from removing  trade taxes. Note the large revenue  loss from removing  export taxes
in reladon to the export tax base.  The reason for this large loss in revenue is the dominating  e-ffect  of
the real exchange rate appreciation  (about  6 percent).  Two effects working in opposite direction are at
play.  On the one hand, by the balance of trade constraint,  the increased  export sales resulting from the
removal of export taxes must be accompanied  by an equal percentage  increase in import volume (about
3 percent).  Even though sectoral imports  do not all increase by the same percentage amount, each one
of them increases. Hence  tax collection  from import duties  increases  when expressed  in foreign  currency
units.  However, there is a countervailing (and dominating) effect coming from the real exchange
appreciation so that the net loss in tax revenue, expressed in domestic currency units,  exceeds initial
government  revenue by 5.2 million FMG.
The welfare gain from abolishing  the excise (consumption)  tax is very small because excise tax
rates are low and relatively  uniform (see table 5).  In this model, there is no labor-leisure  choice and no
consumption-saving  choice. Furthermore  tax revenue is redistributed  in a lump-sum  to the representative
consumer  in the usual fashion. Hence uniform  factor taxation  that would not distort  the wage rental ratio
will not have any welfare effect. Neither will a uniform  value-added  tax which is equivalent  to a uniform
tax on capital and labor income (in the absence  of income transfers from (to) abroad).
The results in table 7, however, suggest a small welfare loss from abolishing  the VAT.  This is
counterintuitive  since there is dispersion  in the small effective  value-added  tax rates across sec.ors. The
result is due to the fact that all the other tax instruments  in the model remain at their base value rates
when the VAT is abolished  and, as noted above, the calculation  is in a second-best  situation.
Next we calculate  the uniform  tax structure  which  would yield  the same revenue  to the government.
We proceed in two steps.  Since there is very little dispersion in effective  rates for the value-added  and24
excise taxes, we concentrate  on trade taxes and on a uniform tax structure across all instruments. First
we calculate  the uniform  tariff structure  that would  yield FMG 156.7 billion  in total government  revenue.
Then we calculate the combined uniform tariff and export tax structure which would give the same
combined revenue  from trade taxes (FMG 200.5 billion). Second, we calculate  the uniform  sectoral tax
structure which would also give the same government revenue as above.  In all cases, as before, the
uniform sectoral tax rates are only applied  to the sectors with positive effective  rates in table 4.  In each
experiment, all calculations are carried out maintaining  the effective tax structure for the other tax
instruments. However, the experiments  are cumulative  so that in the second set of calculations  only the
other tax instruments  have their rates kept at their initial  base values (see table 4 note b).9
Table  8.  Revenue-equivalent  tax  structures
Uniform Tax Structure  Tax Rate'  Welfare change
Import tariff  25.0  6.3
Import tariff and export tax  19.0  3.9
All sectoral taxes given in table 5  6.0  16.8
Note:  Tax rates in percent.  Welfare indicator  as in table 7, expressed in billion FMG.
a.  Uniform rate only applied  to sectors with positive effective  rates in table 5.
We start with uniform  tariff rates. A uniform tariff rate for all imports  (in sectors 1-6)  would still
be discriminatory  since about one quarter of knports would not be taxed.  However, there would be a
9  To calculate the revenue-equivalent  uniform tax structure, the model is solved by adding an
additional equation constraining YO (in table 3  equation 22)  to  its base value with an  additional
endogenous  variable, the endogenous  uniform  tax rate necessary  to satisfy that constraint. Of course, the
uniform rate is only applied  to sectors with positive effective tax rates in table 5.25
welfare gain of 6.3 billion FMG that amounts to 4 percent of the value of the tax base on imports.
Moving  to a uniform export tax and import tariff structure lowers the average tax on taxable tradable
activides  to 19 percent (recall that only the agricultural  sector is taxed) but the welfare gain is smaller.
At first sight tids result is counterintuitive,  but it must be recalled that this experiment starts from a
second-best  situation as taxation, though uniform, discriminates  across sectors since not all sectors are
taxed.  Furthermore,  other tax instruments  are maintained  at their initial  rates.  But the main reason for
this lower welfare gain comes from the raising  of the export  tax on agricultural exports. Increasing  this
already high wedge is very distortionary and contributes  to lowering welfare even though the average
tariff is lowered  at the same time.
We now come to the main result which is the uniformization  of all sectoral tax instruments  listed
in table S. Again this uniformization  is only carried out across the sectors with positive  effective  tax rates
in table S (for example, the excise tax is only applied to the processed food and light industry sectors).
The welfare gain from not discriminating  by sale destination  is quite large, amounting  to 16.8 billion
FMG or 5 percent of total tax revenue collection.'° Most interestingly, even though not all sectors are
taxed, and uniformity is only achieved  across the four taxes that discriminate  across sectors, a uniform
rate of 6 percent would be sufficient  to yield the same revenue.  Furthermore, the estimated  benefits of
such a move  must be a lower bound estimate  of the efficiency  gains of such a piecemeal  package  as there
would also be less resource waste in directly-unproductive-profit-seeking  (DUPS) activities such as tax
avoidance  and smuggling.
Finally, we provide rough calculations  on the relative  efficiency  of alternative  tax instruments. As
is well-known  from standard  taxation theory [see e.g. Atkinson  and Stiglitz (1990)], the welfare cost of
raising revenue varies inversely with the elasticity  demand on the good to which the tax is applied.  It
10 We also carried out this experiment  with the high and low set of elasticities  described  in footnote
8.  For reasons discussed  in the text below and in figure 1, the corresponding  values for the welfare gain
under the high Oow)  elasticity set are:  32.0 (9.2) billion FMG.26
is also well-known  that taxes which do not discriminate  by destination  of sales are more efficient. To
evaluate  the-fficiency of the alternative  tax instruments,  we calculate  Pigovian  welfare-revenue  ratios for
each one of the alternative tax instruments incorporated in  the model.  All welfare and revenue
calculations  are for 10 percent taxation starting from a distortion-free  equilibrium. 11
To add robustness  to the calculations,  the results are reported in table 9 for a set of high and low
elasticities. An ad-valorem  tariff  duty at rate  t shifts the  world supply  curve of  imports from S. to
SW(1  + t).  Figure 1 shows  the effect of varying  the elasticity  of import demand on the welfare-revenue
ratio.  For the low elasticity demand curve, DL, an ad-valorem  tariff duty of t percent yields higher
revenue at less welfare cost than a high elasticity demand curve, DH.  The same reasoning applies for
excise taxes, and for export taxes in the case of an infinitely  elastic foreign demand for Madagascar's
agricuitural  exports.
The results in table 9 are straightforward  when interpreted  in the light of figure 1. The lower the
elasticity set, the larger the revenue from the 10 percent tax and the lower the excess burden of taxation
(reflected  in a lower computed  value of the welfare-to-revenue  ratio in the last column of table 9).  Also,
an excise  tax is more efficient  than an import  duty because  it does not discriminate  by source. We have
not addressed the issue of export taxation. Madagascar  being a major supplier of vanilla and cloves in
the world market, could hope to raise welfare by taxing clove and vanilla exports.  However, to get an
idea of what the optimal  tax should be for vanilla and cloves would require building a dynamic model
incorporating the reaction of  other suppliers of vanilla and  cloves to  changes in  export taxes by
Madagascar.  This is beyond the scope of this paper, so we do not address the issue of taxation for
vanilla and cloves.
11 The distortion-free  equilibrium  also includes no net transfers (B set equal to zero in table 3) so
as to avoid valuation effects associated  with changes in the value of the real exchange  rate.27
Figure  1.  Elasticity  of  demand  and  efficiency  of  taxation
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ACEG,  CDE  a  revenue  and  welfare  loss  (low  elasticity).
ABFG,  BEF  a  revenue  and  welfare  loss  (high  elasticity).28
Table 9.  Wdfare cost per FMG of tax revenue
(FMG billon)
Elasticityb  Change  in  Change  in Welfare  Welfare +  Revenue
Govenment Revenue
10 percent imporC  H  64.9  -1.78  -2.74
tariff  L  75.9  -0.38  -0.005
10  percent  excise  tax  H  61.7  40.82  -1.3
L  71.7  -0.S0  -0.007
All comparisons  are to tax-free  equilibrium.
a.  Rates  only apply  to sectors  with  positive  effective  rates  in table  4.
b.  Obtained  by doubling  (H), halving  (L) elasticities  reported  in table  5.
6.  Conclusions
This paper started with a review of the Malagasy  tax system, comparing it to that of other low-
income countries. We have shown that the tax system is relatively complicated  with a large number of
exemptions and dispersed tax rates.  Compared with other low-income countries, Madagascar's tax
revenues are skewed towards trade taxes (import duties and especially export duties).  The review
concluded  that not only was the tax structure  distorted  and complex,  but also that it yielded  low revenues,
suggesting  tax evasion.
The second part of the paper developed  a simple static general equilibrium  model with a rich set
of tax instruments to simulate  the effects of piecemeal  tax reform in the Malagasy enviroment.  The
model includes seven tax instruments and was applied to  a  10-sector classification  of the Malagasy
economy for  1988.  Several simulations  were performed to assess both the likely magnitude of tax
evasion  and the benefits of piecemeal  tax reform that would be revenue  neutral in the sense of providing
as much government  revenue as was collected  in 1988.29
Several conclusions  emerged from the simulations.  First, the estimated revenue loss from tax
exemptions  and tax evasion was very large, reflecting in great part a weak administrative  system and
strong incentives  to avoid taxes provided  by high and non-uniform  taxation  across activities. Focussing
solely  on tax revenue (for a subset  of sectors with positive effective  tax rates) from import duties, export
duties, VAT and excise tax, simulations  showed  that a uniform tax rate of 6 percent would have been
sufficient  to raise the same revenue  as collected  under the prevailing tax structure. Furthermore, lower
bound estimates  indicate a reduction in the excess burden of taxation by moving towards uniformity of
about 5 percent of the tax base.  Other results in the paper also suggest  worthwhile  efficiency  gains from
moving towards a more uniform tax structure with fewer exemptions.30
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Appendix: The Madagascar Database
The general equilibrium model described in the previous section was calibrated to Madagascar
starting from a social accounting  matrix (SAM) estimated  for 1988.  The Madagascar  SAM was based
on a 32-sector  input-output  table estimated  for 1984 by the central bank.  This table was aggregated  to
the ten sectors described in table 4 and other data for 1988.  The input-output accounts were then
reconciled  with national  Income  and product  account  data for the same year, including  the five categories
of tax instruments  specified in the CGE model.  National income and tax and tariff data were obtained
primarily  from Guillaumont  et al (1990).
Econometric estimates  for the elasticity  parameters do not exist for Madagascar, so values were
obtained from extraneous sources.  Sensitivity  analysis in the text indicates  that results are not much
affected  by relatively  large variations in elasticity  values. It would also be desirable  to have more direct
accounting  information  for 1988. We feel however, that the estimated SAM provides a consistent and
serviceable  data base for qualitative  simulation  analysis. For our purposes the major data drawback  is
that Madagascar  does not have tax data disaggregated  by sector.  Hence our calculated  imputed values
described in the text may be subject  to a relatively  large margin of error.
A three-sector  SAM is given in table Al.  The three-sector  specification  given here is the simplest
one which captures important  characteristics  of a trade-dependent  economy  like that of Madagascar. Tbe
primary sector is by far the most export-dependent,  and represents  less than 10 percent of imports. The
manufacturing  sector has the predominant  share of imports and exports far less.  The third sector is
completely  nontraded  but accounts  for about  one third of domestic product and over 40 percent of value
added.
As is apparent from the SAM, the direct incidence  of sectoral taxation  is highly  nonuniform. Trade
taxes make up about half of the government's total revenue and about two thirds of its sectoral tax33
revenue.  Moreover,  these  taxes  represent  the  fiscal  discrimination  against  the  primary  sector  and  in favor
of the  manufacturing  sector,  which  was  familiar  in developing  countries  in the 1960's  and  in the 70's (see
Krueger,  Schiff  and Valdes,  1988). Primary  exports  are taxed at an average  rate of 11 percent  and
manufacturing  imports  face  tariff  protection  of about  28 percent.Table Al.  Social Accoudting  Matrix for Madagascar, 1988
(billions  of current FMG)
Ag.  Mfg.  Non-  Sala-  Exploi-  Hose-  Excise  Monep  Ip.  Exp.  Covern-  Acci-  6f Exports  knpots  Thidabke  rks  tation  holds  TVT  Tax  Tax  nf  TariTf  omewt  mUL  ROW  ROW  Totl 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  IS
I  AC.  Expors  189  385  172  0  0  973  0  0  0  0  0  67  49  292  86  2213
2  Mfg.  bnpors  174  141  186  0  0  I0o8  0  0  0  0  0  26  254  142  0  1941
3 Non-Tradabks  640  241  III  0  0  271  0  0  0  0  0  143  133  0  0  1539
4  Salaies  176  103  428  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  707
5  fEyiranion  923  326  616  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1865
6 Hoasewlis  0  0  0  707  186S  0  0  0  0  0  0  5  0  70  0  2647
7mrff  0  22  I8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  40*-
8  Excise Tax  11  10  8  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  29
9  Monpo  JTax  24  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  24
10  6np. TarV  0  156  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  156
11  &p.  rTare  43  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  43
12  Government  0  0  0  0  0  141  40  29  24  156  43  0  0  0  0  433
13 Accwuulaiion  0  0  0  0  0  244  0  0  0  0  0  192  0  0  0  436
14 ROW  33  557  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  590
is LSonSaROW  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  86  0  86
Tool  2213  1943  1539  707  1865  2647  40  29  24  356  43  433  436  S90  86Policy  Research Working Paper Serles
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